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By MERRILL ARMOUR *
T HE resources of the 100,000 or more active civilian pilots and the 60,000
odd civilian aircraft-the flying public-are affected by the action taken
by the aviation industry and the Government to marshall the non-airline avi-
ation resources on a voluntary basis for civilian defense purposes.
In July, 1950 aviation leaders became aware of the immediate need for a
program and a plan of action if the civil aviation resources of the country
were to be ready and able to do their full share for national defense. The
problem was discussed by various segments of the industry in July and rep-
resentatives thereof met as the Emergency Aviation Council in August 1950
and formulated a mobilization plan of action.
The plan was designed to prepare for the worst possible situation-an at-
tack on the continental United States. If civil aviation could be made ready
for this situation it would then be prepared for any lesser emergencies. For
enemy bombed areas, it was pointed out, the functions of civil aviation
should include:





To be ready to discharge its function in the event of such an attack the
mobilization plan pointed out that substantial operations of civil aircraft
must be maintained or the personnel and facilities would not be available at
the time of greatest need. Some of the non-airline activities which should
be continued and which would serve the country production-wise were enu-
merated.
The emergency plan proposed the control of airports, aircraft, personnel
and flight operations, for two primary objectives. One,-control to secure
the utilization of the facilities in our defense program and, two--control for
security purposes.
The plan proposed that airmen should be properly identified by a card
with their picture, description and fingerprints. It was contemplated that
this would permit a screening which would give an opportunity for adequate
security check and provide a reliable force of both airmen and ground per-
sonnel for emergency situations.
The plan provided that substantial control and security would be effected
by a comprehensive organization of airports with a division of these into
control airports and non-control airports. A control airport would be
responsible for all of the non-control airports assigned to it and complete
cooperation between the control and non-control airports would be required.
Aircraft and airmen would be registered either directly at their nearest con-
trol airport or at their nearest non-control airport which, in turn, would sup-
ply the parent airport with these records.
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STATE AND LOCAL
In the registering of the aircraft and airmen, information would be re-
quired to show the service which the aircraft and the airmen would be capa-
ble of rendering and also the type of service they wished to render. There
would be available at each control airport information necessary for the
immediate utilization of the aviation facilities in that area. The plan made
it clear that these control airports would have to be integrated into a na-
tional plan to assure complete utilization of all civil aviation facilities and
the concentration of these at whatever point they might be most useful or
needed.
It was recognized by the Emergency Aviation Council that all of the
planning, organization and records proposed by the plan would not be
enough. If any organization is to operate smoothly in an emergency it must
function to some extent prior to the emergency and must, in a word, try out
its own programs from time to time to see that it can actually operate as
planned.
While the ultimate goal was to provide the nation with the full capacity
of non-scheduled civil aviation for defense emergencies, it was the belief of
the industry that to achieve that goal it was essential to have the program
provide for the maximum use of civil aviation consistent with the country's
defense economy and defense program, believing that there might be a con-
siderable period of semi-emergency status and hoping that the ultimate
emergency for which we should be constantly prepared might not occur.
As part of its general program of action for the appropriate federal and
state government agencies, the following steps were proposed. These are
not given in the order of priority as no such order is deemed possible but
merely for the purpose of summarizing the steps that should be taken.
1. Complete surveys, national and state, as to available civil air re-
sources.
2. Decide on the identification needed by airmen, ground crews, and
aviation radio operators (such as old AGO card) bearing picture,
signature, and thumb prints. Devise a special identification to is-
sue to those who now lack such cards.
3. Plan for supply of aircraft parts and critical materials.
4. Form state aviation councils to advise on plans (also aviation coun-
cils in the larger cities) where such groups do not exist.
5. Select control airports tentatively.
6. Issue unclassified, tentative security rules and forms for study and
comment.
7. Conduct simulated operations to pre-test proposed security rules.
8. Encourage training and practice by all aviation personnel, such as
navigation, meteorology, cross-country flying, and simulated disas-
ter and search missions.
9. Encourage physical check-ups so pilot licenses will remain valid.
10. Arrange police authority for appropriate personnel, if later neces-
sary, to carry arms and make arrests.
11. Encourage operators to buy fuel, parts and other items not now in
short supply.
12. Circulate initial plans and gather information as to activities across
the country to stimulate and guide volunteer effort in advance of a
formalized program.
13. Fix rates for aircraft rental on government missions to cover opera-
tion, maintenance, depreciation and insurance.
14. Encourage publicity of a constructive nature to create new interest
in the role of local airports and civil aircraft for public welfare.
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Development of State Aviation Mobilization Plan
As time went on it became clear that the government was going to be lag-
ging too far behind in implementing and developing the mobilization pro-
gram which had been suggested by the Emergency Aviation Council. Some
of the individual States commenced formulating State organizations to carry
out the general program. It seemed obvious that there was a need for uni-
formity in the State plans and organizations in order to insure satisfactory
results on a national basis. Industry, through the Emergency Aviation
Council, again developed a uniform State plan. This State plan was pub-
lished on December 12, 1950.1 It was designed to fit in with the general
plan for civil defense which has been suggested by National Security Re-
sources Board. The NSRB contemplated that each State would have a civil
defense director directly responsible to the Governor. It seemed proper then
that civil aviation should be directly under the director of civil defense and
the State'plan was designed with this in mind. The State plan, it should be
emphasized, follows the original program for making the control airport the
basic unit in the whole civil aviation defense plan.
In setting up the aviation mobilization programs, it was realized that it
might have to operate while the nation was in one of three general stages of
building military strength. The first was the one then existing, a national
emergency was anticipated but had not been declared by the President; the
second would be that following such a declaration by the President; and the
third would be when we were in a full scale war as a result of a declaration
of war or an enemy attack.
Almost before the work of the Emergency Aviation Council or the Uni-
form State Plan was completed and distributed, the President of the United
States declared a national emergency and the second condition was in effect
even before the "shake-down" tests recommended during the first condition
had been performed. This in itself established the accuracy of industry's
conclusion that the federal government was going to be too slow.
The Emergency Aviation Council
At this point a word about the Emergency Aviation Council itself. The
EAC was in one sense a child of the National Conference of Aviation Organ-
izations. It is an informal organization without constitution, by-laws or offi-
cers. By common consent it has so far confined itself to orgdnizations of
national character. Its actual work and policies have been carried on by per-
sons whose livelihood depends upon aviation. We generally think of such a
group as distinct from government. The Council actually is separate and
distinct from any federal agencies but oddly enough it has as one member
the National Association of State Aviation Officials.
At the time the State plan was developed and published the following
thirteen national organizations participated:
American Association of Airport Corporation Aircraft Owners Asso-
Executives elation, Inc.
Aviation Distributors & Manufac- National Aeronautic Association
turers Association The National Air Council
Aircraft Industries Association of National Association of State Avia-
America, Inc. tion Officials
Airport Operators Council National Aviation Trades Associa-
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associ- tion, Inc.
ation National Flying Farmers Associa-
Aeronautical Training Society tion
Air Transport Association of Amer-
ica
I Copies of the full plan, "State Plan for Civil Aviation in Civil Defense,"
may be obtained from AOPA, Washington, D. C.
